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MERCHANTS LIABILITY FOR FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
The extent of theft loss in the merchandising industry pre-
sents an array of statistics1 which would be staggering if our
common experience had not given us at least the suspicion that
it must be a problem of grand scale. Change your focus from
grand cumulations to individual values and the problem be-
comes pungent. To the individual merchant it can be a highly
critical element in the success or failure of his enterprise. For
instance, the loss of a one-dollar item on which he would have
made a profit of ten cents will as a rule of thumb have to be
offset by the sale of ten like items just to break even. To shut
off this drain the merchant is impelled to take active measures
against the shoplifter. Accosting the suspected thief is necessary
not only to save the merchandise but to discourage future occur-
rences, but it must be accomplished with restraint, deliberation,
and consummate regard for the risks involved.
The merchant's contacts with the suspected patron create a
situation which makes him particularly vulnerable to lawsuit.
The usual complaints to a merchant's overreaching are false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, assault, and
slander. False imprisonment is perhaps the primary threat be-
cause so very little is needed to make out a case-an unjustified
restraint.2 For this reason, the pitfalls of the merchant's conduct
vis-iL-vis the suspected shoplifter will be discussed within a
framework of false imprisonment.
I. FAsE Imhn soM:NT
A false imprisonment occurs whenever one's freedom of move-
ment is wrongfully restrained.3 While the interest in freedom
of movement is necessarily physical, the restraint need not be.
It has a mental quality as well as a physical one.
4
1. See Shoplifting and The Law of Arrest, 62 YALE L.J. 788 (1953); Com-
ment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 887 (1952).
2. Where one brings an action for false imprisonment, all that is necessary
for him to allege and prove is that he has been unlawfully restrained of
his liberty, and it is wholly immaterial to inquire whether the charge
against him, and for which he has been arrested, is well or ill founded
in fact.
Barfield v. Coker & Co., 73 S.C. 181, 188, 53 S.E. 170, 173, (1906); see Mc-
Hugh v. Pundt, 1 Bailey 441 (S.C. 1830).
3. E.g., Thomas v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 236 S.C. 95, 113 S.E. 2d 337
(1960) ; Westbrook v. Hutchison, 195 S.C. 101, 10 S.E.2d 145 (1940).
4. PROSSER, TORTS § 12 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SEconD), ToRTs § 42
(1965). See Gray v. Wallace, 319 S.W2d 582 (Mo. 1958).
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The wrong may be committed by words alone, or by acts
alone, or by both, and be merely operating on the will of the
individual, or by personal violence, or by both. It is not
necessary that the individual be confined within a prison, or
within walls, or that he be assaulted, or even touched. It is
not necessary that there should be any injury done to the
individual's person, or to his character, or reputation. Nor
is it necessary that the wrongful act be committed with
malice, or ill-will, or even with the slightest wrongful in-
tention.5
If mental pressure is brought to bear on one so that he fears
that force will be visited upon him if he does not yield to it, and
he does yield to it, he has been directly injured as well as if he
had been bodily restrained. If the restraint has been wrongful,
and for even a slight amount of time,6 it is an actionable injury
without any showing of actual damages.7 However, the response
must be to force, or words or acts which reasonably portend the
use of force,8 which is immediate,9 or sufficiently near in point
of time to preclude the apparent possibility of escape or avoid-
ance of the force. 10 A voluntary submission to a request is not
an imprisonment." Nor is it actionable if the restraint or im-
prisonment complained of is under lawful process or is otherwise
justified.'
2
5. Westbrook v. Hutchison, 195 S.C. 101, 109, 10 S.E2d 145, 148 (1940),
quotitng from Westbrook v. Hutchison, 190 S.C. 414, 419, 3 S.E.2d 207, 209
1939).
6. Swetnam v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 83 Ariz. 189, 318 P.2d 364 (1957);
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 136 S.W2d 759 (1940);
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Billups, 253 Ky. 126, 69 S.W.2d 5 (1934);
PaossER, ToRIs § 12 (3d ed. 1964).
7. George v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 78 W.Va. 345, 88 S.E. 1036 (1916).
8. E.g., Perry v. S. H. Kress & Co., 187 Kan. 537, 358 P.2d 665 (1961);
S. H. Kress & Co. v. DeMont, 224 S.W. 520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
9. Knowlton v. Ross, 114 Me. 18, 95 At. 281 (1915); Sweeney v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 247 Mass. 277, 142 N.E. 50, 31 A.L.R. 311 (1924).
10. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Billups, 253 Ky. 126, 69 S.W.2d 5 (1934);
Sweeney v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 247 Mass. 277, 142 N.E. 50, 31 A.L.R. 311
(1924).
11. Knowlton v. Ross, 114 Me. 18, 95 At. 281 (1915); Sweeney v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 247 Mass. 277, 142 N.E. 50, 31 A.L.R. 311 (1924); Lester v.
Albers Super Mkts., Inc., 94 Ohio App. 313, 114 N.E2d 529 (1952); Moses
v. Dubois, Dudley 209 (S.C. 1838); S. H. Kress Co. v. DeMont, 224 S.W.
520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). Where one remains voluntarily to clear one's self
of the charge there is no imprisonment, Fenn v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.,
209 S.W. 885 (Mo. 1919), but where one is detained involuntarily, she may
remain to be cleared of the charge without losing the cause of action, if leaving
could be construed as an admission of guilt, Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co.,
244 Mass. 438, 138 N.E. 843, 26 A.L.R. 1329 (1923).
12. Bushardt v. United Inv. Co., 121 S.C. 324, 113 S.E. 637 (1922) ; Barfield
v. Coker & Co., 73 S.C. 181, 53 S.E. 170 (1906) ; Whaley v. Lawton, 62 S.C.
91, 40 S.E. 128, 56 L.R.A. 649 (1901); McConnell v. Kennedy, 29 S.C. 180,
7 S.E. 76 (1888); McHugh v. Pundt, 1 Bailey 441 (S.C. 1830).
[Vol. 17
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False imprisonment is clearly distinct from malicious prose-
cution"3 although there is some confusion due to the rather loose
usage of the term false arrest. The cases speak of false arrest
in the same breath with false imprisonment and again with
malicious prosecution.14 The distinction lies in the existence of
valid legal authority for the arrest.',
There is a material distinction between an action for false
imprisonment and an action for malicious prosecution; the
former proceeds upon the theory that the plaintiff has been
arrested without authority of law and unlawfully deprived
of his liberty, while the latter proceeds upon the theory that
the plaintiff has been lawfully arrested under a warrant
charging a criminal offense, and that such prosecution is
malicious and without probable cause.'"
To illustrate the difference, consider the common law roots of
the two actions: "Trespass will not lie for having the plaintiff
arrested under legal process, if the proceedings were regular on
their face. If they are voidable for matters dehors the record,
the plaintiff's remedy is by special action on the case."1 " In
order to sustain such action the plaintiff must allege and prove
malice, want of probable cause, and termination of the proceed-
ings in favor of the prosecution defendant,' 8 none of which is
necessary to maintain an action for false imprisonment.19
Because invoking legal process requires a higher degree of
concerted, conscious action, there is not that awesome risk that
13. George v. Leonard, 71 F. Supp. 662 (E.D.S.C. 1944) (malicious prose-
cution) ; Burton v. McNeil, 196 S.C. 250, 13 S.E2d 10, 133 A.L.R. 603 (1941);
Cannon v. Haverty Furniture Co., 179 S.C. 1, 183 S.E. 469 (1935) (dissenting
opinion) ; Falls v. Palmetto Power & Light Co., 117 S.C. 327, 345, 109 S.E.
93, 99 (1921) (dissenting opinion); Barfield v. J. L. Coker & Co., 73 S.C. 181,
53 S.E. 170 (1906); McHugh v. Pundt, 1 Bailey 441 (S.C. 1830); PROSSER,
TORTS § 12 (3d ed. 1964).
14. See Wingate v. Postal Tel. & Cable Co., 204 S.C. 520, 30 S.E.2d
307 (1944) and Mr. Justice Cothran's dissent in Cannon v. Haverty Furniture
Co., 179 S.C. 1, 183 S.E. 469 (1935).
15. PRoSSaR, TORTS § 12 (3d ed. 1964); 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment § 4
(1960) ; 22 Am. J R. False Imprisonment § 3 (1939). When the detention is
accomplished by reason of asserted legal authority the term false arrest is
proper. False arrest embraces a false imprisonment and the only distinction is
that a false imprisonment contemplates a discourse of action between private
persons.
16. Barfield v. Coker & Co., 73 S.C. 180, 188, 53 S.E. 170, 173 (1906).
17. McHugh v. Pundt, 1 Bailey 441 (S.C. 1830).
18. 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 4 (1948); 34 Am. JuR. Malicious
Prosecution § 6 (1941). Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S.C. 565, 99 S.E.2d
384 (1957).
19. E.g, Westbrook v. Hutchison, 195 S.C. 101, 10 S.E.2d 145 (1940).
1965] NoTEs
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is involved in false imprisonment which can be committed with
only a momentary indiscretion.
II. Dm=NsEs
Justification for an imprisonment has usually been advanced
under the arrest statute.
20
A. "Who May Arrest a Felon or Thief
Upon (a) view of a felony committed, (b) certain informa-
tion that a felony has been committed or (c) view of a
larceny committed, any person may arrest the felon or thief
and take him to a judge or magistrate, to be dealt with
according to law.21
This statute modifies the common law of arrest in that it
provides for arrest by any person who acts on certain informa-
tion that a felony has been committed. 22 That certain informa-
tion is reasonable, positive, and creditable information of an act
from which the law presumes a felony has been committed.23
It provides justification for a person who arrests on reasonable
and probable grounds one whom he suspects of a felony, even if
the suspected party is innocent, and even though no felony has
in fact been committed.24 It also places two qualifications on
the authority to arrest for larceny. The arresting party must
witness the larceny, and he may only arrest for the purpose of
taking the thief to a judge or magistrate. 25
[I]f a person who arrests a person, with no intention of
taking him to a Magistrate or Judge, it makes no differ-
ence if the arresting party was or was not acting upon infor-
mation that felony had been committed, for a private per-
son can only arrest for the purpose of taking the arrested
party to a Magistrate or Judge, for the purpose of having
him dealt with according to law....
20. E.g., Thomas v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 236 S.C. 95, 113 S.E.2d 337 (1960);
Westbrook v. Hutchison, 195 S.C. 101, 10 S.E.2d 145 (1940).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-251 (1962).
22. See Bushardt v. United Inv. Co., 121 S.C. 324, 113 S.E. 637 (1922);
State v. Griffin, 74 S.C. 412, 54 S.E. 603 (1906).
23. Bushardt v. United Inv. Co., 121 S.C. 324, 113 S.E. 637 (1922).
24. See Mr. Justice Cothran's dissent in Falls v. Palmetto Power & Light
Co., 117 S.C. 327, 109 S.E. 93 (1921).
25. Thomas v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 236 S.C. 95, 113 S.E.2d 337 (1960);
Westbrook v. Hutchison, 195 S.C. 101, 10 S.E.2d 145 (1940).
[Vol. 17
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The obvious purpose of the statute is to permit such an
arrest so as to prevent the possible escape of a felon. And
where there is ample opportunity to procure a -warrant for
the arrest in the usual manner, the failure so to do might
well be significant in determining the reasonableness of the
conduct of the person making the arrest.... But without
regard to that, it would be subversive of the liberty of a
citizen, for which the law is said to be very jealous, if a
private person might arrest and then at his option take the
law in his own hands and conduct an inquisition to deter-
mine whether he should release his prisoner or deliver him
to the constituted official authorities.
2 6
The requirement of taking the person to a judge or magistrate,
while strict as to intent, can be substantially complied with, such
as by taking him to the police.2 7 The responsibility to procure a
warrant may then be assumed by the police.2 1 But there must
be some compliance and it must be done within a reasonable
time or the justification is lost.
A private person who makes an arrest may hold his prisoner
in custody only for a reasonable time. He must without
unreasonable delay, either take him before a magistrate, turn
him over to an officer, or place him in jail. If he fails to do
so, he cannot justify the arrest.
2 9
Practically, the statute is of little avail in the shoplifting
situation. When does one have view of a larceny committed in
a self-service store? If the merchant makes an error in judgment
-a mistake-he is absolutely liable for any restraint because
reasonable cause under the arrest statute justifies only arrest for
a suspected felony. The preponderance of consumer items, par-
ticularly in a self service operation, are not of sufficient value
to elevate their theft to a felony. The shoplifting statute30
provides for a higher scale of penalties than for simple petit
larceny 3l but it does not of itself establish the offense as a
felony."2 The stiffer penal sanctions undoubtedly provide a
26. Westbrook v. Hutchison, 195 S.C. 101, 111-12, 10 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1940).
27. Burton v. McNeil, 196 S.C. 250, 13 S.E.2d 10, 133 A.L.R. 603 (1941).
28. See Thomas v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 236 S.C. 95, 113 S.E.2d 337 (1960).
29. Westbrook v. Hutchison, 195 S.C. 101, 112, 10 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1940),
quoting 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 17 (1937).
30. S.C. COD ANN. § 16-359.1 (1962).
31. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-353 (1962). Simple larceny of an article be-
low the value of twenty dollars is a misdemeanor.
32. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11 to -13 (1962).
NoTs19651
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deterrent, but they do not give any help in defending civil lia-
bility. Because of the stringent requirements of justifiable
arrest and the consequent need for protection of the store-owners,
South Carolina has moved with a growing number of states to
recognize probable cause as a defense in an action for the deten-
tion of a suspected shoplifter, whether it be but a misdemeanor
or not.88 Like most of the efforts in this direction, the legislation
creates a qualified rather than a complete defense.
8 4
B. Temporary Detention
The recent amendment to the shoplifting statute provides that:
In any action brought by reason of having been delayed by
a merchant or merchant's employee or agent on or near the
premises of a mercantile establishment for the purpose of
investigation concerning the ownership of any merchandise,
it shall be a defense to such action if: (1) The person was
delayed in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time
to permit such investigation, and (2) reasonable cause
existed to believe that the person delayed had committed the
crime of shoplifting. 5
This enactment brings South Carolina under a doctrine which
has been ostensibly regarded as allowing the defense of probable
cause in an action for false imprisonment, but it is limited to the
situation where one is acting in defense of his property. It
providently comes before a case provoking acceptance or rejec-
tion of the principle, 6 and as yet there are no cases under it.
The principle of the right to detain for investigation is a de-
33. See ProssER, TORTS § 22 (3d ed. 1964); See also Comment 19 MD. L.
lhv. 28 (1959); Comment, 58 MicH. L. REv. 429 (1960).
34. See Comment, 47 N.w. U. L. REV. 82 (1952).
35. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-359.4 (Supp. 1965).
36. But note the rather expansive statement of Mr. Justice Cothran in a
dissenting opinion:
One who is charged with the custody and control of property of another
is authorized to do any and all things necessary to protect and preserve
the property. If it were necessary to arrest one to prevent a theft of the
property, he would be authorized to cause such an arrest, not to punish
the offender, but to prevent the theft. After a theft is committed, how-
ever, he would have no authority to put the criminal law in operation,
because the object then sought, and the result thereby attained, would
not be the protection or preservation of the property, but the punishment
of the criminal and the vindication of justice.
Falls v. Palmetto Power & Light Co., 117 S.C. 327, 345, 109 S.E. 93, 99
(1921).
6
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rivation of the common law rights of defense and recapture,8 7
logically extended to allow an investigation where it is not cer-
tain, but only apparent, that another is interfering with one's
property. Protection of property is the distinction, and the rea-
son for the introduction of probable cause as an element of
justification:
[I]n all cases involving solely the legality of the process,
it is obvious that probable cause is not pertinent to any issue
in the case. Because of like irrelevancy, the statement may
properly be made in cases of illegal arrests upon suspicion
by a private person where, by statutory authority or other-
wise, he is permitted to make such arrest only when the
offense is being committed in his presence .... However,
those authorities which hold, where a person has reasonable
grounds to believe that another is stealing his property, as
distinguished from those where the offense has been com-
pleted, that he is justified in detaining the suspect for a
reasonable length of time for the purpose of investigation in
a reasonable manner . . . must necessarily proceed upon the
theory that probable cause is a defense. And this is the law
because the right to protect one's property from injury has
intervened.38
However, while the statute extends the common law self-help
rights, it bears its own rather strict limitations.
The most notable authority for the temporary detention of .
suspected thief is Collyer v. S. H. K'ess & Oo.3 9 which arose in
California in 1936. The Collyer case took dicta from three earlier
cases 40 and ruled that where one has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that another is taking one's property-even though it be a
mistaken belief and even though it is but a misdemeanor-he
may detain the person in a reasonable manner for a reasonable
time for the purpose of investigation.
41
37. PRossmz, TORTS § 22 (3d ed. 1964).
38. Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 177, 54 P.2d 20, 23 (1936);
quoted in Teel v. May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W.2d 74, 137
A.L.R. 495 (1941).
39. 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
40. The wellspring of the right to detain is Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co.,
244 Mass. 438, 138 N.E. 843, 26 A.L.R. 1329 (1923) where the court said there
would be a right to detain the plaintiff if she had apparently not paid for what
she had received, but having paid the defendant's demand she had an unqualified
right to leave. See also Standish v. Narragansett S.S. Co., 111 Mass. 512, 15
Am. Rep. 66 (1873); Fenn v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 209 S.W. 885
(Mo. 1919).
41. Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
NoTs1965]
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The amendment is largely a codification of the rule in Collyer.
The statute and Collyer expressly limit the detention to a rea-
sonable time in a reasonable manner on reasonable grounds.
Implicit in Collyer was that detention was justifiable only when
the offense was being committed and not when it was complete.
This is the limit of the rule as adopted in Teel v. May Dep't
Stores 0o.42 in Missouri, but Bettolo v. Safeway Stores, InG.,48
which followed on the heels of Collyer, bore a statement to the
effect that it also applied to offenses that were complete.44 How-
ever, from the facts of the case it was not necessary to go so far.
The statute provides for detention on or near the premises, as did
Collyer, so the act progresses after the actual taking of the
merchandise. The right to detain ought to extend to fresh pur-
suit reasonably near the premises.45 Perhaps in this determina-
tion the point where the motive of recapture stops and the motive
to punish begins should be considered.
The purpose of the detention is investigatory. It is temporary
and does not give one the right to purport to make an arrest
or take into custody. 40  One can identify the parties, establish
the circumstances, and collect witnesses. If the circumstances are
then such as to satisfy the merchant of the guilt of the detained
party, he must proceed through the normal processes of law and
call the police. 4
7
42. 348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W.2d 74, 137 A.L.R. 495 (1941).
43. 11 Cal. App. 2d 430, 54 P.2d 24 (1936).
44. Id. at 432, 54 P.2d at 25.
45. The probable limits of fresh pursuit are prompt and persistent efforts to
recover the property without any undue lapse of time during which it may be
said pursuit has come to a halt. PRossER, TORTS § 22 (3d ed. 1964). In J. C.
Penney Co. v. O'Daniell, 263 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1959) which arose in Okla-
homa, employees pursued the plaintiff out of the store, in and out of several
stores, and stopped her aboard a bus. The case indicated this was permissible
under the rule. The South Carolina statute reads "on or near the premises"
and how far beyond a check-out counter or parking lot this means must in-
evitably be determined by what is reasonable under all the circumstances.
46. PROssER, TORTS § 22 (3d ed. 1964); Virginia, having adopted the rule,
W. T. Grant Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 141 S.E. 860 (1928), denied probable
cause as justification in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. 485, 50
S.E.2d 387 (1948) where the detention proceeded to arrest and trial. In Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1952) the law of
Virginia was stated that reasonable cause is a defense to temporary detention.
A similar parallel but more pointed occurs in Tennessee: Compare Martin v.
Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App. 42, 181 S.W.2d 638 (1944), with
Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W.2d 13 (1943). The de-
fense is valid for a temporary detention only and not for arrest or taking the
party into custody. But see Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Waller, 208 Ark.
1063, 189 S.W.2d 361 (1945).
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Because the plaintiff in a false imprisonment action need not
allege or prove want of probable cause, the burden of proving
the existence of probable cause as an element of justification is
on the one asserting the lawfulness of the detention;48 but there
is authority that the plaintiff, pleading an unlawful restraint,
must prove that the restraint was unreasonable to make out his
case.
49
What constitutes reasonable cause is, as always, a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact.50 From the facts as established, the court
will test their sufficiency as reasonable cause.5 ' Where the facts
do not admit of but one inference the question of reasonable
cause is for the court, 52 and the standard applied is an external
one.53 "The question is not whether ... [the actor] thought the
facts to constitute probable cause, but whether the court thinks
they did."54 It is governed by the same principles as probable
cause in malicious prosecution.55 Probable cause requires a state
of facts that would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence
to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the
person detained is guilty.50)] Mere suspicion is not sufficient.
What is required is a reasonably grounded suspicion.5 7 The re-
port of a third person based only on suspicion has been ruled
unreasonable,58 but where a manager was informed that a cus-
tomer had seen a person surreptitiously taking goods, the man-
ager might reasonably detain one answering the description else-
where on the premises.5 9
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-359.4 (Supp. 1965) ("It shall be a defense..
Director Gen. of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923) ; J. C. Penney
Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 148 So. 2d 679 (1963) ; Teel v. May Dep't Stores Co.,
348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W.2d 74, 137 A.L.R. 495 (1941); Isaiah v. Great Ati. &
Pac. Tea Co., 111 Ohio App. 537, 174 N.E.2d 128, 86 A.L.R.2d 435 (1959).
49. See Burnaman v. J. C. Penney Co., 181 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1960);
Lester v. Albers Super Mkts., Inc., 94 Ohio App. 313, 114 N.E.2d 529 (1952).
50. J. C. Penney Co. v. O'Daniell, 263 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1959); Delp v.
Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores, 238 Ore. 538, 395 P.2d 137 (1964).
51. Gibson v. J. C. Penney Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 640, 331 P.2d 1057 (1958).
52. Director Gen. of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923); Collyer
v. S. H. Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936); Bettolo v. Safeway
Stores, 11 Cal. App. 2d 430, 54 P.2d 24 (1936) ; Rothstein v. Jackson's of Coral
Gables, Inc., 133 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
53. Director Gen. of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923).
54. Id. at 28.
55. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1952).
56. Gibson v. J. C. Penney Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 640, 331 P.2d 1057 (1958).
57. Aley v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 211 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Mo. 1962);
Gibson v. J. C. Penney Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 640, 331 P.2d 1057 (1958); Wilde
v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 160 So. 2d 839 (La. 1964); J. C.
Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 148 So. 2d 679 (1963).
58. J. C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 148 So. 2d 679 (1963).
59. J. C. Penney Co. v. O'Daniell, 263 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1959).
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Certainly concealment of merchandise, as under section 16-
359.2 of the Code,60 or partial concealment,6 would constitute
reasonable cause. Each case, of course, will be decided on its own
particular facts and circumstances. A less obvious instance than
concealment is a case where a customer placed an article of ap-
parel around her waist and proceeded to walk away.6 2 A store
security officer might reasonably react when he was told that a
customer had taken two garments into a dressing room and come
out with one.6 3
Accosting a person with a past history of shoplifting was al-
lowed in one case, but there was testimony that in the present
instances a taking of merchandise had been witnessed. 4  This
case was criticized however, and evidence of shoplifting in the
past would not be admissible to establish reasonable cause for
a detention. 5
What is a reasonable manner, and a reasonable time, is in the
domain of the jury,06 and the two questions are closely interre-
lated. One may use only reasonable force to effect the deten-
tion6 7 and if it is exceeded justification will be lost.68 Likewise,
the right to detain is no license to insult or abuse and if the actor
is excessively vehement there may be liability for slander69 and
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3592 (1962). "Any person wilfully concealing un-
purchased goods or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment
either on the premises or outside the premises of such store, shall be prima facie
presumed to have so concealed such article with the intention of converting it
to his own use without paying the purchase price thereof. .. "
61. Delp v. Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores, 238 Ore. 538, 395 P2d 137 (1964).
62. Rothstein v. Jackson's of Coral Gables, Inc., 133 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1961).
63. Gibson v. J. C. Penney Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 640, 331 P.2d 1057 (1958).
64. Burnaman v. J. C. Penney Co., 181 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1960) (tried
without a jury and no objection was made), criticized in Aley v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 211 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
65. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Smalley, 26 Ala. App. 176, 156 So. 639
(1934).
66. Delp v. Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores, 238 Ore. 538, 395 P.2d 137
(1964).
67. E.g., Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936) ; Bettolo
v. Safeway Stores, 11 Cal. App. 2d 430, 54 P.2d 24 (1936).
68. E.g., Teel v. May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W2d 74, 137
A.L.R. 495 (1941). See also Peak v. W. T. Grant Co., 386 S.W.2d 685 (Mo.
1964).
69. Burnaman v. J. C. Penney Co., 181 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1960);
Camp v. Maddox, 93 Ga. App. 646, 92 S.E.2d 581 (1956); Little Stores v.
Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W.2d 13 (1943); W. T. Grant & Co. v.
Owens, 149 Va. 906, 141 S.E. 860 (1928). In Little Stores v. Isenberg, supra,
where the alleged defamatory words-"you didn't pay for your groceries"-
were spoken in a crowd, a publication could be inferred without producing a
witness who had heard it, but in Burnaman v. J. C. Penney Co., supra, the
court ruled against the plaintiff on the point of slander because they intro-
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assault as well70 It is obviously beyond reason to confine a
person in a small room to compel a confession.71 One may re-
quest a confession,72 for recovery of the goods is no less than a
confession, but he cannot compel or coerce a confession. Nor is
he allowed to conduct a search of the person.3 When the tenor
of conduct begins to sound more of punishing the offender than
of protecting the property, the merchant has gone as far as he
can go.
What is a reasonable time depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. In Collyer 4 a detention of twenty to
thirty minutes was reasonable, but approximately the same
length of time in confinement until a confession was signed
would be patently unreasonable.7 5 A reasonable time should be
whatever is needed to conduct a reasonable investigation. Such
investigation could include an identification, an inquiry to estab-
lish the facts, and, perhaps, a reasonable time for an employee
to summon a supervisor with decision-making capacity. Once
the purpose for which the statute allows a detention is satisfied
-the goods are returned,7 6 payment is tendered,7 7 or the cashier
vindicates the suspect 8 -any further delay is unreasonable.
III. CONCLUSIoN
This type legislation has been criticized from both ends. It
is thought to be rather niggardly in increasing protection of mer-
chants on one hand, and to be a danger to constitutional rights
70. Perry v. S. H. Kress & Co., 187 Kan. 537, 358 P2d 665 (1961) ; A false
imprisonment always involves a technical assault and if combined with a battery
it does not change the character of the action but merely serves to increase
actual damages.
71. See Wilde v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 160 So. 2d 839
(La. App. 1964); W. T. Grant & Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 141 S.E. 860
(1928.)
72. E.g., Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
73. Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W.Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959). But
see Gibson v. J. C. Penney Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 640, 331 P.2d 1057 (1958),
where the plaintiff was required to undress, and Burnaman v. J. C. Penney
Co., 181 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1960) where reasonable search was allowed
under a Texas statute allowing "seizure" of the goods.
74. Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
75. See Wilde v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermkts., 160 So. 2d 839 (La.
App. 1964).
76. Teel v. May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W.2d 74, 137 A.L.R.
495 (1941).
77. Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass. 438, 138 N.E. 843, 26 A.L.R.
1329 (1923).
78. Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass. 438, 138 N.E. 843, 26 A.L.R.
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on the other. Neither criticism burns in the conscience, and, taken
together, they are probably a fair recommendation for it. It
does give the merchant a valuable margin of time to deliberate
his actions without immediately incurring liability. A too hasty
reaction such as pinching a young pilferer by the ear is an ex-
cellent way to be later introduced to his guardian ad litem. With
the proper approach, an inquiry will make the point so far as
it is needed for the discouragement of others, and, if further
action is called for, the merchant can proceed under advisement.
A little tact will go a long way. Too often overzealousness comes
with the idea of making an example of the suspect. The small
amounts usually involved should not cause the loss of objectivity
on the part of employees that so often occurs. In one instance
there was testimony that a manager of a super market pushed a
sixty-three-year-old lady's face against a plate glass window be-
cause he thought she had taken a few dress zippers70
There is more realism than cynicism in recognizing that the
larger merchandising companies make the most inviting defen-
dants, but they are also in the best position to establish a check
list or an operating procedure to guide employees in these situ-
ations-and to see that they use it.80 Whereas before the amend-
ment preventive measures were nearly frustrated because almost
any action was perilous, now the situation is very favorable for
effective prevention.
RALPH C. ROBINSON, JR.
79. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1952).
80. Evidence showed a manager of a store had slapped and shoved a sixteen
year old girl, and the manager responded in the affirmative when asked if he
had followed the standard operating procedure. Peak v. W. T. Grant Co., 386
S.W.2d 685 (Mo. 1964). In Safeway Stores v. Barrack, 210 Md. 108, 122
A.2d 457 (1956), after evidence that the employee had abused and vilified the
plaintiff, he replied that his instructions were to use his own discretion in deal-
ing with the "nasty" ones-to do what he wanted to with them.
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